BAKU, Azerbaijan, April 2. Throughout the war with Iran, Washington’s public messaging has shifted - refined, recalibrated, and at times contradicted itself. Yet one throughline has remained strikingly consistent: President Donald Trump has repeatedly framed the central objective as preventing Tehran from acquiring nuclear weapons.
It is within that logic that one of the most aggressive - and perilous - scenarios has taken shape: not merely striking Iran’s nuclear infrastructure, but physically seizing its stockpiles of enriched and highly enriched uranium.
This would be no symbolic gesture, no one-off military episode. It would amount to an extraordinarily complex, multi-phase operation - technically grueling and politically fraught. It would require deep penetration into Iranian territory, securing multiple sites, establishing defensive perimeters, clearing debris, identifying and verifying materials, loading and transporting hazardous cargo - all under the constant threat of direct combat.
Trump’s own rhetoric on the issue has wavered in recent days. On March 29, he declared that Iran must hand over its highly enriched uranium to the United States or face catastrophic consequences. The message landed like an ultimatum: relinquish the material that could underpin a nuclear weapons program - or brace for overwhelming military force.
But by March 31, the tone had shifted. The uranium stockpile, he suggested, was no longer an immediate priority. Buried deep underground and shielded by the aftermath of last year’s strikes on Iranian nuclear facilities, it was now considered difficult to access and relatively secure. Still, U.S. intelligence reportedly maintains that Iran has not lost access to the material entirely. In other words, even if facilities have been damaged or buried, that does not mean the uranium itself is gone.
Trump has stopped short of closing the door on a potential operation. He has made clear that no final decision has been made - and that, from Washington’s perspective, the war cannot be considered over until the United States is confident Iran is incapable of building a nuclear weapon. On April 1, he went further, suggesting Iran may already lack that capability, and that the uranium - now so deeply buried - has dropped down the list of immediate concerns. At the same time, he emphasized ongoing satellite surveillance, signaling that the U.S. intends to keep a constant watch.
Still, the very fact that such an operation remains under consideration speaks volumes. Destroying a facility from the air is one thing. Entering it - clearing wreckage, locating specific containers, verifying their contents, safely extracting and transporting them out of a country that retains significant military capacity - is something else entirely.
In theory, the forces the U.S. has already deployed to the region might be sufficient to carry out a uranium extraction mission at sites like Isfahan and Natanz - both of which were targeted during the 12-day summer war. But manpower alone solves nothing. What matters in such scenarios is the ability to control territory, secure access routes, maintain air cover, provide engineering support, and prevent the operation from unraveling in its earliest hours.
Washington has previously floated a set of sweeping demands in exchange for sanctions relief, including the dismantling of Iran’s nuclear capabilities, the destruction of key facilities in Natanz, Isfahan, and Fordo, and the transfer of enriched uranium under the oversight of the International Atomic Energy Agency. That alone underscores how far the issue has moved beyond disputes over centrifuges or enrichment levels. What’s at stake now is physical control over the material at the heart of the problem.
According to U.S. media reports, Trump is actively considering a military operation to remove that uranium. Such a mission would be extraordinarily difficult and would likely require American troops to remain on Iranian soil for several days - if not longer. That alone changes the nature of the scenario. This would not be a quick strike or a show of force. It would mark the beginning of something closer to a limited ground campaign.
Before the June operation, estimates suggested Iran possessed more than 400 kilograms of uranium enriched to 60 percent, along with nearly 200 kilograms enriched to 20 percent - a stockpile that could be relatively quickly brought up to weapons-grade levels of 90 percent. These numbers are what make the issue so urgent. As long as such reserves exist, strategic uncertainty remains. Even with damaged infrastructure, the material itself continues to pose a future risk.
At the same time, publicly available data offers little clarity on where exactly this uranium is stored, what condition it is in, how deeply it is buried, whether it has been moved since the strikes, or how much may remain trapped under rubble. That uncertainty alone makes any operation inherently dangerous. U.S. forces would be operating without full situational awareness - where any miscalculation about location, volume, or condition could stall the mission, disrupt its tempo, and force a shift from planning to improvisation under fire.
Current assessments suggest that a significant portion of the stockpile likely survived in underground sections of the Isfahan complex. But there is no guarantee it is all concentrated there. Some may remain at other sites, including Natanz. That alone turns any potential operation into a logistical nightmare. If the uranium is dispersed across multiple locations - if the underground infrastructure has been altered by bombing - then the mission ceases to be linear. It becomes a sprawling campaign involving assault operations, engineering reconnaissance, mine clearance, logistics, and continuous defensive coverage.
There is no version of this that resembles a quick in-and-out raid. If access points to underground tunnels are blocked, they would first need to be cleared. That means heavy equipment, time, noise, vulnerability - and the need to secure the perimeter, suppress potential attacks, maintain air cover, and defend against drones, missiles, and ground counterattacks. This is not a job for a small special forces unit slipping in and out within hours. The scale of the task demands an entirely different operational architecture.
In practice, such a mission would require first suppressing air defenses, neutralizing site security, and establishing a persistent protective umbrella over the area. Then comes the need for a forward operating airstrip - or the seizure of an existing one - to handle incoming aircraft and equipment. After that, a layered air defense system, ground security forces, and engineering units capable of clearing debris, cutting through obstructions, and reinforcing access points. Only then could specialized teams descend into underground levels, locate containers, verify their contents, and prepare them for extraction.
In other words, this would not be a single operation but a chain of tightly linked military actions, where the failure of any one link could collapse the entire plan.
The sequence would likely begin with securing a foothold in the operational area, followed by establishing safety around the site and along supply routes. Next would come the delivery of engineering equipment capable of clearing debris, breaching passages, extracting containers, and preparing them for evacuation. Then specialists would need to confirm the material - its identity, condition, and integrity - ensuring there are no leaks, damage, or booby traps. Only after that could transport begin, using specialized containers designed for hazardous cargo.
Geography adds another layer of complexity. If the focus is Isfahan, a viable operation would require either capturing a nearby airfield or constructing a temporary landing zone capable of handling transport aircraft and heavy equipment. One theoretical option is the nearby Badr airbase - but seizing and holding such a site would significantly raise the stakes, effectively expanding the operation into a broader military engagement. And if the mission extends to Natanz - or especially to Fordo, buried deep בתוך a mountain - the complexity multiplies dramatically. At that point, what began as a targeted operation starts to resemble a full-scale ground campaign with a high risk of escalation and prolonged involvement.
Why Even Elite Units Wouldn’t Be Enough
Even the most elite special operations forces could not pull off a mission like this on their own. They would need a massive support apparatus: airpower, airborne elements, engineering units, explosive ordnance disposal teams, hazardous materials specialists, electronic warfare systems, missile defense coverage, real-time intelligence, and - critically - a substantial contingent of conventional troops to hold territory and repel counterattacks. This stops being a surgical strike and starts looking like a full-spectrum military architecture, with special forces as just one component in a much larger machine.
Complicating matters further, prior strikes on Iran’s nuclear facilities may have made the mission harder, not easier. What was once a known - if heavily fortified - underground complex could now be a partially collapsed maze of voids, debris, blocked entrances, and warped internal structures. That makes planning based on preexisting schematics far less reliable. U.S. forces might not encounter the facility they trained for, but rather a chaotic subterranean labyrinth where even minor engineering miscalculations could cost time, lives, and operational control.
If the operation were to extend beyond Isfahan to include sites like Natanz and especially Fordo - buried deep בתוך a mountain - the level of difficulty would spike dramatically.
Given the specialized nature of the mission, U.S. Special Operations Command would almost certainly take the lead, overseeing the most elite units in the American military. But even that formidable structure would not be sufficient on its own. The operation could require elements from across the entire command: Delta Force, DEVGRU (formerly SEAL Team 6), the 160th Special Operations Aviation Regiment - the “Night Stalkers” - and likely significant conventional forces to secure and coordinate the broader battlespace.
The destruction inflicted on Iranian nuclear facilities by U.S. and Israeli strikes only adds another layer of complexity. Even if units had conducted extensive rehearsals, they were almost certainly training on intact mock-ups of Iranian sites - not on shattered, unstable structures.
It is entirely plausible that forces could fight their way in, only to find themselves calling in the Navy’s Seabees - combat engineers - to make the site navigable. In fact, engineering units may prove to be the decisive factor between success and failure.
Then there is the problem of physically handling the uranium. The material is stored in cylinders resembling scuba tanks, which would need to be placed into specialized transport containers - potentially under fire. While personnel would be equipped with protective gear and trained to handle hazardous substances, that hardly guarantees a smooth operation.
Transport itself presents another layer of risk. The uranium is not stored as exposed metal but as uranium hexafluoride - a chemical compound. That means the primary danger is not intense radiation, but extreme toxicity and chemical reactivity. Handling it would require full chemical protection, strict containment protocols, airtight integrity checks, and highly controlled loading procedures. Radiation would not be the main threat to personnel - but chemical exposure, leaks, or container damage could turn the extraction phase into a mission of its own.
And all of this would unfold against the backdrop of an adversary that remains far from defeated. Despite heavy losses, Iran retains substantial military capability. Its strategic position has been weakened, but not broken. The Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps and regular armed forces could still mount resistance, flood the operational area with manpower, threaten encirclement, or drag U.S. forces into prolonged, attritional fighting.
Perhaps most importantly, Tehran would likely anticipate such a move. It understands which sites would be targeted - and could prepare accordingly, building layered defenses, reinforcing protection, setting ambushes, deploying strike systems, and even planning to relocate or destroy the material preemptively.
The Question at the Center of It All
Against that backdrop, the central question becomes unavoidable: Is the objective worth the risk?
On paper, the logic behind such an operation is easy enough to follow. As long as enriched and highly enriched uranium still exists, the door remains open for Iran to restart its nuclear program. If the war ends and that material survives - if at some point in the future it once again becomes accessible to Tehran - Iran could eventually return to rebuilding the program. Knowledge does not disappear under airstrikes. Neither do trained personnel, technological capacity, or the scientific infrastructure that sustains a nuclear effort. You can destroy a facility. You cannot bomb away accumulated expertise.
The cost of that choice, however, is just as clear. It would mean an extraordinarily dangerous insertion of American forces deep into Iranian territory, with consequences no one could confidently predict. Even if the operation ended in formal success, there is no guarantee it would not spiral into a broader ground war, trigger heavy casualties, set off a wider regional escalation, or drag the United States into yet another major Middle East conflict.
Washington still has another path available: trying to force a transfer of the material through diplomatic pressure. The White House has repeatedly signaled that it wants the question of enriched uranium folded into any possible settlement. The problem is that Tehran has so far rejected American proposals, and the prospects for a political agreement remain deeply uncertain. More than that, Washington has already hinted at other coercive options, including strikes on Iran’s energy infrastructure and even the possible seizure of Kharg Island, the critical hub of Iranian oil exports through which as much as 90 percent of the country’s crude shipments pass.
That means the uranium issue does not exist in isolation. It sits inside a much broader strategy of coercion. If diplomacy collapses for good, the White House could return to the hardest option on the table: the physical seizure of the material itself. At that point, the United States would be confronting not only a military challenge, but a historic one - how to do more than merely hit a nuclear program, and instead literally pull its most dangerous component out of the ground on enemy soil.
At the same time, the post-strike picture remains deeply ambiguous. Yes, Iran’s infrastructure took heavy damage. Yes, its enrichment capacity is widely believed to have been sharply reduced. Yes, Tehran is not currently seen as operating at the same pace or scale of weapons-grade production as before. But none of that amounts to a final resolution. As long as the stockpile survives, as long as the scientific base remains intact, and as long as the political will exists, the possibility of a return remains very much alive.
That is the core tension running through the entire story. Airstrikes can slow the program, wreck infrastructure, push timelines back, sow chaos, and shatter supply chains. But if the end goal is to eliminate, once and for all, any possibility that Iran could obtain a nuclear weapon, then smashing concrete and steel may not be enough. At that point, a far more consequential question comes into view: Is Washington prepared to go further - to turn a war fought at a distance into a war of physical incursion for the sake of a few hundred kilograms of material buried under rock, steel, earth, and fire?
That is why any potential operation to seize Iran’s uranium looks less like a dramatic show of force than one of the most dangerous scenarios in the current Middle East escalation. It would not be a display of resolve so much as a test of the outer limits of American will, military logistics, and political readiness to pay an enormous price in pursuit of finally closing the Iranian nuclear file.
